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A Strong Voice for
Keeping America Strong
A Profile of Senator Bourke Hickenlooper
EDWARD L . SCHAPSMEIER
FREDERICK H . SCHAPSMEIER
BOURKE BLAKEMORE HICKENLOOPER of Cedar Rapids represented
Iowa in the United States Senate for nearly a quarter of a cen-
tury. His years of public service on the national level, from 1945
to 1969, were exceeded in length only by William B. Allison of
Dubuque (who served in the upper chamber from 1873 to 1909).
The latter, however, served in an era when senators were
chosen by state legislatures. In view of the fact that
Hickenlooper also held various state offices for ten years (four
as state representative, four as lieutenant governor, and two as
governor), he was designated the "winningest" Republican in
Iowa history.*
Born at Blockton in southwest Iowa on July 21, 1896,
Bourke was the son of Nathan C. and Margaret A. Blakemore
Hickenlooper. After attending public schools and earning a high
school diploma at Blockton, he enrolled at Iowa State Univer-
sity in 1914. Bourke Hickenlooper interrupted his college educa-
tion to enlist in the army and served in France as a second lieu-
tenant with the 3rd Battalion, 339th Field Artillery. After the
war he reentered Iowa State and graduated in 1919 with a
degree in industrial science. In that same year he entered the
University of Iowa Law School and graduated with a law degree
in 1922. Hickenlooper moved to Cedar Rapids and practiced
1. Cedar Rapids Gazette. 6 September 1971, quoted in "Iowa State Senate
Memorial Resolution, " Memorial Addresses and Other Tributes in the Con-
gress of the United States on the Life and Contributions of Bourke B.
Hicfcen/ooper (Washington, D.C, 1972), vii.
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law until being elected to the Iowa House of Representatives in
1934. He proved ultimately to be an extraordinarily successful
campaigner by winning senatorial elections in 1944, 1950, 1956,
and 1962.^
Republican colleagues regarded Hickenlooper as the most
"consummate skeptic" in the Senate.^ He displayed a conserva-
tive skepticism over the development of the welfare state and
subsequent deficit spending needed to finance expanding federal
programs. In denying that he was a reactionary for opposing
President Harry Truman's Fair Deal proposals, Hickenlooper
informed a constituent of his concern over the "utter lack of
responsibility in the Administration's increased tax and in-
creased spend[ingl policy, combined with the mounting na-
tional debt and international problems that are terrific and that
must be solved in our own interest."^ Because he disliked un-
balanced budgets and waste in government, Hickenlooper was a
vigorous, self-appointed watchdog over the activities of
Washington's many bureaucrats.
Senator Hickenlooper was a stalwart midwesterner, who,
in the words of the New Republic's TRB, "ought to be holding a
pitchfork in Grant Wood's 'American Gothic' "^  He had a
reputation as the "hardest-working Republican in congress,"
but was also dubbed the "most anonymous man in the Senate."*
Hickenlooper was a highly respected member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee for twenty years, six as ranking
Republican, but he never gained the national prominence of his
Democratic counterpart, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas.
While serving as chairman of the Senate Republican Policy
Committee from 1962 to 1968, he was overshadowed by the
2. He successively defeated Guy M. Gillette (incumbent), Albert J.
Loveland, R. M. Evans, and Albert B. Smith.
3. "Bourke Hickenlooper is Dead: Former Iowa Senator Was 75," New
York Times, 5 September 1971, in New York Times Biographical Edition (New
York, 1979), 278.
4. Hickenlooper to Dick Mason, 6 May 1949, "Political—General, 1949,"
Bourke B. Hickenlooper Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West
Branch, Iowa (hereafter cited as BBHP).
5. Richard L. Strout, TRB, Views and Perspectives on the Presidency
(New York, 1979), 278.
6. Clipping, Cleveland Plain Dealer, 24 May 1959, "Clippings
1959—Personal," BBHP.
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personal dominance of Senate Minority Leader Everett M.
Dirksen of Illinois.' Hickenlooper was a follower not a leader.
Only two major pieces of legislation bear his name; the Cole-
Hickenlooper Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (authorizing develop-
ment of nuclear power by private utilities) and the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Aid Act of 1963 (cut-
ting off United States assistance to any country which ex-
propriated American-owned property).*
His humble demeanor and low profile in national politics
did not prevent Hickenlooper from being regarded as a
tenacious anti-Communist crusader and cold war warrior. As a
man who believed in fairness and strict due process he did not
emulate the witch-hunt tactics of either Patrick McCarran or
Joseph R. McCarthy. Hickenlooper feared the threat of internal
subversion at home and the threat of Communism abroad. His
stance stemmed from an old-fashioned patriotism dictating that
the United States, as leader of the Free World, must defend
democracy and the concept of self-determination all over the
world. To achieve these foreign policy goals Hickenlooper
believed that the United States should maintain a strong
military establishment—including a monopoly on the atomic
bomb—so that it could either deter or defeat Communist ag-
gression anywhere on the globe. He supported negotiating with
the Soviet Union and other Communist regimes only where the
United States did "not negotiate from a standpoint of weakness
7. Members of the committee were: Hickenlooper; Dirksen; Thomas
Kuchel, California; Frank Carlson. Kansas; Norris Cotton, New Hampshire;
Roman Hruska, Nebraska; Kenneth Keating, New York; Thruston Morton,
Kentucky; Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts; Hugh Scott, Pennsylvania;
Margaret Chase Smith, Maine; Milton Young, North Dakota; Barry
Goldwater, Arizona; and Winston Prouty, Vermont. The committee was
charged with preparing party policy statements, keeping records of all votes,
circulating analyses of pending bills, acquiring research material, providing
summaries of laws, supplying professional assistance, and distributing
minutes. See "Senate Republican Policy Committee Minutes,' 17 Janu-
ary 1963, BBHP.
8. While voting for foreign aid bills, Hickenlooper fought against making
a host of nations permanently dependent on United States assistance. He
thought that recipient nations should undertake internal reforms and initiate
self-help programs to continue being eligible for American aid. See




where the result would be surrender by the Free World."' When
a friend in Iowa, the editor of the Mason City Globe Gazette,
criticized him for voting to cut the appropriation of the Dis-
armament Agency (the creation of which he had opposed),
Hickenlooper defended his stance: "I continue to revert to the
experience of the Pilgrim Fathers and others in the wilderness of
the new world when they went to church on Sunday but carried
their flintlocks and stacked them conveniently in the corner for
immediate use if the savages attack."^"
One of Hickenlooper's first important votes after entering
the Senate was to support the United States' participation in the
newly founded United Nations. This represented a switch from
his pre-World War II isolationism. He defended his position by
explaining to a constituent, "I believe we must take our proper
and enlarged part in international matters."^' Hickenlooper sup-
ported President Truman's foreign policy of containing Com-
munism. He voted for $400 million in military and economic aid
to Greece and Turkey in 1947, for the Marshall Plan in 1948,
and for ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
in 1949. Hickenlooper supported foreign aid expenditures as a
means of preventing underdeveloped nations from falling to
Communism, but he remained critical of bureaucratic misman-
agement. He justified his voting record over the years by argu-
ing that such monetary outlays were "in our national interests
of helping to build the Free World into a bulwark to resist Com-
munist imperialism . . . through helping nations engaged in the
revolution of 'rising expectations' to achieve their development
peacefully." He also reminded a critic, "I have consistently
criticized inefficiency, waste, corruption, and misdirection of
these programs."'^
Hickenlooper believed America should preserve its monop-
oly of the atomic bomb as a vital deterrent to Soviet imperial-
ism. While a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
9. Hickenlooper to Moss M. Tangen, IS February 1965, BBHP.
10. Hickenlooper to W. Earl Hall, 11 June 1963, Legislation—Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Act, 1963-1964," BBHP.
11. Hickenlooper to A. E. Baldridge, 10 November 1945, "Per-
sonal-Baldridge, A. E.," BBHP.
12. Hickenlooper to David Baur, 24 September 1965, Legisla-
tion—Foreign Aid, August 1965-April 1966," BBHP.
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Bourke and Vema Hickenlooper watch returns during his
first Senate race, November 1944.
he maneuvered unsuccessfully to secure General Leslie R.
Groves's appointment as chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC). The AEC was established under the authoriza-
tion of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which transferred
management, regulation, research, and future development of
atomic energy for both military and peacetime use from the
secret Manhattan Project {headed by Groves) to the civilian-
controlled AEC. During debate on the Atomic Energy Bill,
Hickenlooper supported the concept of civilians controlling the
commission but desired military control over nuclear weapons
to ensure protection of atomic secrets. Fellow Iowan Henry A.
Wallace, secretary of commerce in the Truman administration,
complained to the president that the measure was too 'extreme
in the matter of security regulations and violations."'^ David
13. Wallace to Truman, 9 November 1945, quoted in The Price of Vision:




Lilienthal, who agreed with Wallace, had worked with Dean
Acheson to formulate an international plan to share atomic in-
formation. He also felt free scientific inquiry would be inhibited
by excessive secrecy. Truman chose Lilienthal—not Groves—in
1946 to be chairman of the newly created AEC. Hickenlooper
eventually voted for Lilienthal's confirmation as chairman of
the AEC, despite charges leveled by Senator Kenneth McKellar
that Lilienthal sympathized with Communism. McKellar had
been conducting a personal vendetta against Lilienthal for some
time and Hickenlooper discounted his allegations.
Hickenlooper's concern for national security grew with the
1945 revelation that a Russian spy ring had been operating dur-
ing the war in Canada.'* He did not want to share information
with either Canada or Great Britain, let alone the Soviet Union.
Confiding his fears to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then
chief of staff, Hickenlooper stated, " . . . I do not believe that
the time has come when we should either altruistically disclose
all of our military secrets or abandon further development [of
atomic weapons].""
In 1949 the AEC's Argonne Laboratory reported the disap-
pearance of an ounce of the uranium isotope, U-235. Soon after
this incident, it also became known that an AEC research fel-
lowship had been awarded to an acknowledged member of the
American Communist party. Now a member of the Joint Con-
gressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Hickenlooper
publicly charged Lilienthal with "incredible mismanagement."^*
1 want to re-emphasize that I have not in any degree impugned
Mr. Lilienthal's personal honesty nor his personal patriotism to
his country. I believe he is sincere in his beliefs and his policies. It
is with his policies and with a continuation of those policies that I
sharply disagree.'^
Even though liberals labeled Hickenlooper's attack as un-
14. For more details see The Report of the Royal Commission to In-
vestigate Disclosures of Secret and Confidential Information to Unauthorized
Persons (Ottawa, 1946).
15. Hickenlooper to Eisenhower, 3 June 1946, "AEC Commis-
sion—Groves, General Leslie R., March 1946-June 1947," BBHP.
16. Press Release, 22 May 1949, "Investigations of Hickenlooper, Bourke
B.," BBHP.
17. Press Release, 26 May 1949, ibid.
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just, he did not cease his efforts to remove Lilienthal. He be-
lieved that the AEC chairman could not observe the tight securi-
ty regulations under which he had to operate. Publicly Lilien-
thal denied being guilty of poor administration, but in his per-
sonal journal he admitted that the Argonne "lab's property pro-
cedure and our own [AEC's] are sloppy and lax."'* Lilienthal
also explained his refusal to have the FBI conduct investigations
to establish security clearances for AEC research scholarship re-
cipients: he personally detested secrecy and undue security pre-
cautions as conflicting with academic freedom and scholarly in-
quiry, so "we decided not to ask for FBI investigations."^' The
result of this decision was that Hans Freistadt, an Austrian-born
student at the University of North Carolina and a self-admitted
Communist, received an AEC fellowship.
Democrats on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
quickly sought to terminate its investigation of Lilienthal to
limit the political fallout. Hickenlooper, on the other hand, at-
tempted to deepen the probe. He also resented President Tru-
man's lack of cooperation with the joint committee. The major-
ity report ultimately did vindicate Lilienthal. Republican
senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan befriended Lilien-
thal but nevertheless acknowledged to Hickenlooper that his in-
vestigatory efforts were salutary. "My considered verdict is," he
wrote, "that the inquiry disclosed many needs for reforms and
improvement; . . . that the commission itself—and thus the
country—immediately benefitted from these lessons; and that
this whole vast atomic enterprise is bound to be safer as a result
of your courageous activities.""
On February 15, 1950, only a short while after denying
Hickenlooper's charge, Lilienthal resigned as chairman of the
AEC. In his diary Lilienthal asserted that the "reason was not
Hickenlooper . . . nor the terrible kind of responsibility in-
volved." The "basic reason" for quitting was "secrecy." The lat-
ter, he wrote, "was so contrary to my experience . . . that it
18. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthai 6 vols. (New
York, 1964-), vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years. 1945-1950. 531.
19. Ibid., 530.
20. Vandenberg to Hickenlooper, 25 January 1950, in The Private Papers




poisoned the work; then made it actually distasteful."^' For just
this reason Hickenlooper had wanted an experienced military
man, such as General Groves, to be the custodian of atomic
research and development; Groves had proved his ability to
maintain tight security as head of the Manhattan Project. British
physicist Klaus Fuchs's conviction for espionage, British scien-
tist Donald Maclean's defection to Russia, and Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg's trial all served to heighten Hickenlooper's ap-
prehension over internal subversion and laxity of security in
government agencies.^ ^
IN 1950 a fellow midwesterner and GOP Senate cohort, Joseph
R. McCarthy, grabbed the public limelight by claiming in a
speech given at Wheeling, West Virginia that the Truman ad-
ministration refused to discharge fifty-seven known Com-
munists from the State Department. The Senate majority
leader, Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, sponsored Senate Resolution
231 authorizing a temporary subcommittee of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee to hold hearings investigating McCarthy's sen-
sational charges. Hickenlooper served on this subcommittee.
Democrat Millard E. Tydings of Maryland was designated
chairman. He was advised by Lucas: "It seems to me that Mc-
Carthy should either affirm or deny these charges. I tried to get
him to do this on the floor of the Senate, and he refused."^^
Partisan politics and controversy surrounded the Tydings
Committee from the start. With midterm elections approaching,
the Democrats wanted to discredit McCarthy while the
Republicans saw an opportunity to exploit the Communist
issue. By now Senator McCarthy had increased his list of sup-
posed Communists in the State Department to eighty-one.
When Senator Tydings took the position of judging the ac-
21. Lilienthal, Journals, vol. 4, The Road to Change. J955-Í959. 119.
22. For more details see Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The
Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), 340-341. Herken
labels Hickenlooper a "notorious anglophobe" (380). Although Hickenlooper
disliked the socialist government in Britain, his aversion to sharing atomic
secrets was to prevent exactly what occurred in the Fuchs and Maclean spy af-
fairs. He did not want to share information with any country.
23. Memorandum, Lucas to Tydings, 27 February 1950, Box 20, Papers of
Scott W. Lucas, Illinois State Historical Society, Springfield, Illinois.
369
THE ANNALS OF IOWA
curacy of McCarthy's charges before the investigation started,
committee member Henry Cabot Lodge claimed the hearing was
"some sort of kangaroo court."" Hickenlooper tried to steer a
middle course amid this whirlwind of political passion. To a
constituent who criticized him for not publicly condemning
those alleged Communists named by McCarthy, Hickenlooper
defended his behavior by explaining: "I think this is the proper
theory of presumption of innocence that surrounds any one un-
til adequate proof is forthcoming." He also indicated that while
being "utterly fair" it was also necessary that the investigation
be conducted "vigorously and as deeply as possible. . . . "^^
At the first executive meeting of the Tydings Committee,
Hickenlooper and Lodge, the only two Republican members,
proposed calling Senator McCarthy before the subcommittee so
that he might disclose privately whatever information he pos-
sessed. Majority Leader Lucas had made this same recommen-
dation. The Democrats on the subcommittee, however, rejected
this suggestion on procedure. McCarthy also notified
Hickenlooper that Chairman Tydings refused to permit the Wis-
consin senator to cross-examine witnesses appearing before the
subcommittee. McCarthy insisted, "I sincerely hope that you
and Senator Lodge make it clear that you have no part in this in-
excusable failure to bring forth the truth in every manner pos-
sible.""
At Hickenlooper's urging, the Tydings Committee did ask
the State Department for the loyalty files of the eighty-one indi-
viduals accused by McCarthy. After examining eight files Hick-
enlooper concluded that they had been expurgated, yet he felt
they were still sufficiently incriminating to make him highly
skeptical of the efficacy of the Truman loyalty program; "I
don't hesitate to say on this record that the ones I read I would
say almost without exception I would not keep in the State
Department.""
24. Quoted in Thomas C. Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A
Biography (New York, 1982), 249,
25. Hickenlooper to Guy E. Hillier, 3 April 1950, "Disloyalty Investiga-
tions—Kenyon, Dorothy, 1950," BBHP.
26. McCarthy to Hickenlooper, 16 April 1950, "Disloyalty Investiga-
tions—McCarthy, Senator Joseph R., 1950-1951," BBHP.
27. Quoted in William F. Buckley, Jr., and L. Brent Bozell, McCarthy and
His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning (Chicago, 1954), 357.
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The Tydings Committee report—which represented the
views of the Democratic majority—exonerated the State De-
partment of any charges relating to alleged laxity in its security
program while labeling McCarthy's accusations a "fraud and
hoax."^* Neither Hickenlooper nor Lodge signed the report.
They protested that the investigation was incomplete and con-
stituted a whitewash of the State Department. Even Senator
Margaret Chase Smith, no friend of McCarthy's, agreed with
Hickenlooper that the Democrats on the Tydings Committee
"made the fatal error of subjectively attempting to discredit Mc-
Carthy rather than objectively investigating and evaluating his
charges."^'
After winning reelection for a second term in 1950, Hicken-
looper renewed his demand for "a thorough and extensive
housecleaning of the whole State Department."^" He also called
for Secretary of State Dean Acheson's resignation for having
made a blundering speech in which he excluded South Korea
from the United States' defense perimeter—thus seeming to in-
vite an invasion by Communist North Korea. When President
Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur for advocating
total military victory in Korea, Hickenlooper supported the
deposed general. The Iowa senator even advised the use of
atomic weaponry "whenever it can be materially decisive for
victory."^'
Erroneously believing Communism to be monolithic in
nature, with the Soviet Union as leader of the Communist bloc,
Hickenlooper opposed all trade with this group of nations. He
also did not favor diplomatic recognition of the People's
Republic of China or, after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba,
giving foreign aid to any nations "which continue to ship
strategic material, including munitions, to Communist
Cuba. . . . " " Hickenlooper thought the public should have
28. Quoted in Richard H. Rovere, Senator ]oe McCarthy (Cleveland,
1966), 156.
29. Margaret Chase Smith, Declaration of Conscience, ed. William C.
Lewis, Jr, (Garden City, N.Y., 1972), 9.
30. Quoted in Ronald J. Caridl, The Korean War and American Politics:
The Republican Party as a Case Study (Philadelphia, 1969), 85.
31. Ibid., 175.
32. Hickenlooper to Ken Boatright, 31 January 1963, "Legisla-
tion—Foreign Aid, 1962-1963," BBHP.
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complete information about mainland China's fall to Com-
munists and felt that the China White Paper did not reveal all
the facts. He urged John Foster Dulles, when he became secre-
tary of state in 1953, to issue another "special volume on United
States-China relations" from 1941 to 1950. In addition he
pressed for publication of all diplomatic papers of World War II
"down through Cairo, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. . . . "^ ^
Such volumes were subsequently published.
Hickenlooper was associated with the conservative wing of
the Republican party led by Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio,
but he went to the party's 1952 national convention as an un-
pledged delegate. When the balloting began he voted for
Dwight D. Eisenhower. During the ensuing campaign he
worked hard for Eisenhower's election while criticizing the
Democratic nominee. Governor Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois,
for advocating an end to testing atomic bombs. {Ironically, in
1963, Hickenlooper changed his mind and voted for the Test
Ban Treaty.) Hickenlooper congratulated "Ike" on his victory at
the polls indicating, "My one great desire is to cooperate to the
best of my ability in the tremendous job . . . in reestablishing
sound and trustworthy government in the country."^'*
During the Eisenhower years Hickenlooper tended to
modify his "hawk" stance to support the president's attempt to
moderate the cold war. But in 1953 Hickenlooper opposed
Charles Bohlen's appointment as ambassador to the USSR be-
cause of the latter's role at the Yalta conference in formulating
what the Iowan regarded as the "sell out" of Poland. Also after
the Army-McCarthy hearings, when President Eisenhower
worked behind the scenes for Senate censure of McCarthy,
Hickenlooper remained loyal to the Wisconsinite. Explaining
why he voted against McCarthy's condemnation, Hickenlooper
asserted: "I was one who felt that facts justifying the so-called
censure of Senator McCarthy had not been established to the
point of warranting censure. I said at the time that I disagreed
with and criticized certain things which Senator McCarthy had
33. Hickenlooper to Dulles, 1 May 1953, "Publications of Foreign Rela-
tions," BBHP.
34. Hickenlooper to Eisenhower, 10 November 1952, "Political Cam-
paigns of 1952," BBHP.
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said, but I could not bring myself to vote for his official
censure.""
Hickenlooper admired John Foster Dulles and therefore
supported key aspects of the Eisenhower administration's
foreign policy. Where once he had disapproved of any foreign
aid to a Communist nation, he now supported both economic
and military assistance to Yugoslavia to bolster Marshall Tito's
independence from Moscow. He also approved formation of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and voted for military and
economic support to Middle East countries to buttress non-
Communist governments. He even voted for ratification of the
Antarctica Treaty in 1950 in which the United States and eleven
other nations, including the Soviet Union, agreed to peaceful
use of that region. After Dulles died in 1959, Hickenlooper
maintained that it was the former's "policies of firmness, tough-
ness, and strength which really brought Soviet aggression to a
standstill.""
HICKENLOOPER'S final term in the Senate coincided with
America's increasing involvement in Vietnam. He was one of
the sponsors of the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution
in 1964 giving President Lyndon B. Johnson authority to "take
all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."^'
Although once referring to Vietnam as "quicksand" from which
the United States must extricate itself,^ * he nevertheless de-
fended the escalation of United States intervention with his own
version of the domino theory;
The stakes are too high, so far as future world peace is concerned,
tragic though our losses may be, for the United States to now per-
mit communist success in South Vietnam, as it would immedi-
ately threaten . . .the Philippines, Australia, the whole Pacific
35. Quoted in Roy Cohn, McCarthy (New York, 1968), 237.
36. Hickenlooper to Robert W. Turner, 8 July 1959, "Foreign Rela-
tions—Bohlen, Charles E., 1953-1964," BBHP.
37. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the
Presidency. 1963-1969 (New York. 1971), 117-118. Other sponsors included J.
William Fulbright, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee; Richard Russell;
and Leverett Saltonstail. The latter two were respectively chair and ranking
Republican member of the Armed Service Committee.
38. Quoted in Time, 13 August 1965.
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Senate colleagues Everett M. Dirksen and Bourke Hickenlooper, 1963.
area and have devastating adverse influence on the newly
developing nation-states of Africa, the Middle East and Latin
America. ^ ^
Hickenlooper never changed his "hawk" stance regarding
the Vietnam conflict. He doggedly insisted there was "no other
course, in the interest of our own security and that of the free
world, except to win it." He believed the war had to be fought
to a successful military victory so that the "principles of self-
determination and freedom for the peoples of Southeast Asia
are protected and the North Vietnamese aggression halted."
When Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York suggested debate on
possible revision of the Southeast Asia Resolution, Hicken-
looper admonished his colleague: "Frankly, I think this would
add a tremendous amount of fuel to the fire and . . . provide a
field day for those who have been so highly critical of that
Resolution." Hickenlooper furthermore decried the activities of
antiwar protesters. He contended that their protest marches




aided and abetted the enemy by convincing "the Viet Cong, the
Chinese, and the Russians that if they just hang on a while
longer in Vietnam internal force will bring on a victory in Viet-
nam for the aggressor. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong."""
The decision not to run for a fifth Senate term in 1968 was
made not because Hickenlooper feared to face the Iowa elec-
torate which he had served for thirty-three years, but because of
his advanced age—seventy-three years—and because his wife,
Verna, was ill. She died in 1970 and he on September 4, 1971.
Fortunately for him, he did not live to witness the fall of South
Vietnam to its Communist conquerors; this event would have
grieved him deeply. In the realm of international relations
Hickenlooper saw America's primary role as that of striving for
the "preservation of freedom in the world."*^ That the United
States should do less was unthinkable to him. He was a man of
sustained purpose who symbolized the unswerving stand of a
generation called on repeatedly to fight, sacrifice, and even die
for the defense of democracy in faraway places. His thinking
did not change when the Vietnam War became unpopular.
During the national debate on Vietnam there were those
who claimed that Hickenlooper's old-fashioned patriotism was
not only archaic and simplistic, but actually harmful to the na-
tion's real security. The label "cold war warrior" became a
denigrating designation within the neo-isolationist atmosphere
of the post-Vietnam era. Always skeptical of Kremlin inten-
tions, Bourke Hickenlooper wrote a friend, "It is interesting to
note that so long as we had a firm, consistent, strong, yet open-
minded, policy the Russians made almost no gains and seemed
to be moving more toward an accommodation with the
West.""
In retrospect a strong argument can be made that Hicken-
looper overreacted to the cold war. If there was an area in
40. Hickenlooper to Cliff Anderson, 2 August 1965, "Viet Nam Cor-
respondence, 1965-1966," BBHP; Hickenlooper to Pat Austin, 13 January
1966, ibid.; Hickenlooper to Javits, 15 November 1967, "Viet Nam—Tonkin
Gulf, 1967-1968," BBHP; Hickenlooper to Mrs. Francis A. Lackner, 28 March
1968, "Viet Nam Correspondence, 1968," BBHP.
41. Cedar Rapids Gazette. 6 October 1961, quoted in Memorial Ad-
dresses, 44.
42. Hickenlooper to W. Earl Hall, 11 June 1963, "Legislation—Anns Con-
trol and Disarmament Act, 1963-1964," BBHP.
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which he was a zealot, it was in the realm of preserving the in-
ternal security of the country and ensuring the containment of
Communism abroad. Nevertheless, he reflected an anti-Com-
munist mentality applauded by his constituency and held for-
eign policy views similar to other midwestern Republicans of
the time.*^ The fact also remains that the fear and tension
fostered by Communist gains after World War II were more
alarming to a generation that regarded Soviet Communism as
the totalitarian successor to Germany's Naziism. If Hicken-
looper was single-minded and overly zealous in his determina-
tion to protect the American way of life and to defend the prin-
ciple of self-determination throughout the world, he erred due
to an intense patriotism and a belief that the "American
century" should become a reality. That illusion has faded, but
Bourke Hickenlooper, an exemplary cold war warrior, strove
for nearly a quarter of a century to make it come true. His ac-
tions might be challenged but not his motives. He was, as
Representative H. R. Gross observed in paying tribute to him, a
persistent "strong voice for keeping America strong."*^
43. Midwestern Republicans in this genre included Kenneth Wherry and
Roman Hruska of Nebraska, Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, Homer E.
Capehart of Indiana, George Wilson of Iowa, Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois,
and Homer Ferguson of Michigan.
44. Des Moines Register. 9 September 1971, quoted in Memorial Ad-
dresses, 36.
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